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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Petitioner Luis Antonio Dutton-Myrie petitions for 
review of a ruling by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA” or “Board”) dismissing his appeal of the decision by 
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that he is ineligible for deferral 
of removal under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
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Punishment. S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 
(“CAT”).  Dutton-Myrie contends that the Board erred in 
affirming the IJ’s conclusion that the government of Panama 
would not be willfully blind to torturous acts against him and, 
in any event, stated incorrectly what constitutes acquiescence 
to torture by Panamanian officials.  He also asserts that the IJ 
is biased against him and this, among other things, violated 
his due process rights.   
We conclude that the BIA did not apply the correct 
legal standard under the CAT and should have reviewed the 
IJ’s application of this standard de novo.  We remand on these 
grounds.  While we reserve judgment on Dutton-Myrie’s due 
process claim, we express concern that the IJ’s opinion 
suggests such frustration with this case (which appears to 
have nine lives) that the Board should consider assigning it to 
a new IJ if further fact-finding is necessary.  
I. Facts and Procedural History 
a. Dutton-Myrie’s background 
Dutton-Myrie is a native and citizen of Panama who 
came to the United States on a visitor’s visa in 1991 and 
remained after his visa expired six months later.  In the early 
1990s he pled guilty to cocaine-related offenses and criminal 
attempt to commit escape. 
In 1998 the former Immigration and Naturalization 
Service charged Dutton-Myrie as removable for overstaying 
his visa and as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony for 
trafficking in a controlled substance.  An IJ sustained the 
charges against him and ordered him removed to Panama.  
Government agents began the process of deporting Dutton-
Myrie, but he de-boarded the plane undetected before it left 
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the United States and continued to live in this country without 
legal status.  
The Government apprehended Dutton-Myrie in 2005 
and deported him to Panama. A few days after he returned, 
the record indicates that a group of men came to his ex-
girlfriend’s apartment and stabbed him in the neck.  He fled 
the country and re-entered the United States through its 
southern border.  
The Government apprehended Dutton-Myrie a second 
time in 2007 and charged him with illegal re-entry.  He 
ultimately pled guilty to these charges and was sentenced to 
time served.1  The Government then transferred him to the 
custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).  
b. Removal proceedings before the Immigration 
Judge 
The United States Department of Homeland Security 
reinstated in 2012 the final order of removal against Dutton-
Myrie.  However, an asylum officer found he expressed a 
reasonable fear of returning to Panama and referred him to an 
IJ.  Dutton-Myrie filed an application for deferral of removal 
under the CAT based on his claim that members of the Mara 
Salvatrucha (“MS-13”) gang would likely torture him if he 
returned to Panama.   
Dutton-Myrie represented himself at the hearing on his 
application.  He testified that his uncle, Reginaldo, and his 
brother, Ricardo, started a gang called La Banda del Norte in 
the 1980s in his hometown of Colón, Panama.  Over time the 
                                              
1 He was also sentenced to two years of supervised 
release in the event that he was not immediately deported to 
Panama.  
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gang spread beyond Colón, entering into feuds with rival 
gangs, including the MS-13.  Dutton-Myrie claimed that 
members of the Panamanian MS-13 were responsible for 
beating Reginaldo to death in Brooklyn, New York, in 1992, 
and for murdering Ricardo in Panama four years later. 
According to Dutton-Myrie, the MS-13 targeted male 
family members living in Panama because of their kinship 
ties to Reginaldo and Ricardo: in 1995, Dutton-Myrie’s 
brother Jose was drowned; his brother Nelson was beaten and 
stabbed in 1997; his brother Arnaldo was shot in 2001, was 
attacked again in 2004, and died in 2009 after members of the 
MS-13 shot him 21 times; and in 2010 his brother Regelio 
was shot twice but survived.  
Dutton-Myrie further testified that gang members 
attacked him immediately after he arrived in Panama in 2005.  
A former girlfriend in Panama submitted an affidavit attesting 
that she called the police to report the attack, but no officer 
came to investigate.  Dutton-Myrie then fled the country.  He 
stated that he believed the police were either bribed by the 
MS-13 or were unwilling to protect his family, and he 
supported this conclusion with record evidence of his 
brothers’ deaths and testimonial evidence that the 
investigations into the murders and violent attacks remained 
unresolved. Dutton-Myrie also submitted a letter from the 
Panamanian Department of Public Safety confirming the 
deaths of his family members, stating that his surviving 
family members receive death threats, and referencing a 
complaint that his mother made reporting threats to her 
children’s lives. 
The IJ found Dutton-Myrie to be credible, accepting as 
true his testimony that the gang had killed several of his 
family members and that police had not prosecuted anyone 
for these crimes.  Though expressing “concerns for [the] 
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safety” of Dutton Myrie if he were removed to Panama, the IJ 
nonetheless determined that he failed to establish that 
Panamanian officials would consent or acquiesce to the harm 
he feared and thus denied his CAT claim.   
c. The  BIA’s first ruling 
Dutton-Myrie appealed the IJ’s conclusion that he was 
not eligible for CAT relief.  The BIA affirmed, holding that 
“[t]he evidence d[id] not establish that the Panamanian 
government acquiesces to torture by gangs, as the term has 
been interpreted by the Third Circuit, but rather shows that it 
has been actively trying to combat them.”   
d. The Government requests remand 
Dutton-Myrie petitioned our Court for review.  The 
Attorney General filed a motion to remand to “allow the 
Board to reconsider and/or clarify the bases for its  .  .  .   
decision in light of Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen. of the 
U.S., 671 F.3d 303, 311-14 (3d Cir. 2011).”  We granted this 
motion and remanded the case to the BIA, whereupon it 
vacated its first decision and remanded to the IJ.   
e. The Immigration Judge’s second decision and 
the BIA’s second ruling 
The IJ issued a second ruling in 2013.  He again 
denied CAT relief.  Though the IJ found that Dutton-Myrie’s 
“credibility [was] not at issue,” CAT protection remained 
unavailable because he determined Dutton-Myrie had not 
established that the Panamanian government “permit[ted] a 
certain level of gang violence in order to inflict severe pain or 
suffering on him.” On appeal, Dutton-Myrie argued the IJ 
applied an erroneous legal standard for acquiescence by 
requiring him to show the Panamanian government intended 
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that he be tortured.  
The Board sustained the appeal.  It agreed that the 
specific intent requirement applies only to those who commit 
acts of torture, whereas an applicant need only show willful 
blindness to establish acquiescence to the torture by others.  It 
also noted that the IJ failed to consider evidence relevant to 
the likelihood of future harm.  The Board therefore found it 
“necessary to again remand [for the IJ] to reassess whether 
[Dutton-Myrie] established acquiescence” despite the 
Panamanian government’s opposition to the MS-13, as well 
as “evidence of future torture.”   
f. The IJ’s third decision and the Board’s remand 
The IJ denied relief a third time in 2014.  There he 
relied on independent research he put into evidence, including 
a 2011 Panama Crime and Safety Report and an article from 
Panama Digest, which he found suggested the MS-13 gang 
was a “recent phenomenon” in Panama.  The IJ further 
deviated from his prior two findings of credibility, stating 
instead that the evidence cast “serious doubt on the veracity 
of [Dutton-Myrie]’s claim that MS-13 lay behind the 
devastation to his family.”  The IJ discounted the letter from 
the Department of Public Safety in Panama as unverified.  He 
then concluded without discussion that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish willful blindness. 
Dutton-Myrie appealed, and once again the Board 
ordered a remand to the IJ for further proceedings.  It held 
that he erred in (1) questioning Dutton-Myrie’s credibility 
despite finding him credible in prior proceedings, (2) failing 
to notify Dutton-Myrie that further corroboration was 
required, and (3) relying on an internet search that was not 
part of the record of proceedings.  The Board directed the IJ 
on remand “again [to] determine whether [Dutton-Myrie] 
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established acquiescence, as well as evidence of the 
likelihood of future torture.”   
g. The IJ’s fourth decision and the Board’s 
affirmance 
On remand, the IJ requested that both parties respond 
to the country conditions evidence the IJ introduced 
previously.  The record contains notice of a hearing, yet the 
BIA cannot locate a transcript of the hearing and the 
Government now contests Dutton-Myrie’s claim that it 
occurred.  In his fourth decision, the IJ concluded that there 
was no rebuttal of the evidence suggesting that the MS-13 
had only recently begun to infiltrate Panama and opined that 
he was “wholly unconvinced” that the group had attacked 
Dutton-Myrie and his brothers.  Yet the IJ specifically 
stepped back from any adverse credibility determination as 
the legal basis for his decision.  Instead, he relied on his 
conclusion that Dutton-Myrie could not establish the 
Panamanian government would acquiesce to the harm he 
alleged and cited the absence of corroborating evidence that 
the MS-13 was responsible for the deaths of Dutton-Myrie’s 
family members or that it was operating in Panama when the 
attacks occurred.  The IJ also found that Panama was actively 
combating gangs and that Dutton-Myrie could not establish 
that it was unwilling or unable to protect him because he had 
not reported the 2005 attack to the police and presented no 
further evidence that a public official was “willing to do him 
harm or [to] acquiesce in someone else doing him harm.”   
Once again, Dutton-Myrie appealed the IJ’s decision, 
and here the BIA dismissed the appeal.  It discerned no clear 
error in the IJ’s finding that the Panamanian government fell 
short of acquiescing to torture.  The Board supported this 
conclusion by citing to the IJ’s findings that (1) “Panama 
‘actively engage[s]’ against criminal gangs and combats 
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crime,” and (2) “although the applicant was attacked in 
February 2005, he never reported the incident to police.”  The 
BIA also rejected Dutton-Myrie’s due process claims, finding 
insufficient evidence that the IJ harbored personal bias 
against Dutton-Myrie or that the IJ failed to consider relevant 
evidence.  While the Board recognized that  “the [IJ] did not 
specifically reference a letter from the Department of Public 
Safety in Panama [confirming his family members’ deaths, 
stating that his surviving family members continue to receive 
death threats, and referencing his mother’s complaint 
reporting threats to her children’s lives],” the Board 
concluded that “this [was] insufficient to establish that the [IJ] 
did not consider this evidence.”  Another petition for review 
followed.  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to 
review a final order of the BIA denying CAT relief.  
However, because Dutton-Myrie is subject to removal based 
on an aggravated-felony conviction, the statute constrains our 
jurisdiction to “constitutional claims or questions of law,” as 
“factual or discretionary determinations are outside of our 
scope of review.”  Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (referring to the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(C)-(D)).  
Constitutional claims or questions of law we review de 
novo.  Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 
2007).  Where the BIA affirms and partially reiterates the IJ's 
discussions and determinations, we look to both decisions.  
Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).  If the 
Board relies only on some of the grounds given for denying 
relief, we review only these grounds.  Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 
484 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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III. Analysis  
a. The Convention Against Torture 
Article 3 of the CAT provides that “[n]o State Party 
shall expel, return .  .  .  or extradite a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”  “The 
burden of proof is on the applicant .  .  .  to establish that it is 
more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if 
removed to the proposed country of removal.”  8 C.F.R. § 
1208.16(c)(2).  “For an act to constitute torture under the 
[CAT] and the implementing regulations, it must be: (1) an 
act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) 
intentionally inflicted; (3) for an illicit or proscribed purpose; 
(4) by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical 
control of the victim; and (5) not arising from lawful 
sanctions.”  Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 
2005) (citing Matter of J–E–, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 297 (BIA 
2002)).  “If an alien produces sufficient evidence to satisfy 
that burden, withholding of removal or deferring of removal 
[under the CAT] is mandatory.”  Silva–Rengifo, 473 F.3d at 
64 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18). 
 To establish acquiescence, an applicant must 
demonstrate that, prior to the activity constituting torture, a 
public official was aware of it and thereafter breached the 
legal responsibility to intervene and prevent it.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.18(a)(7).  The applicant can meet this standard even 
where the government does not have actual knowledge of the 
torturous activity if he “produc[es] sufficient evidence that 
the government [] is willfully blind to such activities.”  Silva–
Rengifo, 473 F.3d at 65; see also Gomez–Zuluaga v. Att’y 
Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 350 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Silva–
Rengifo, 473 F.3d at 65).  “[A]ll evidence relevant to the 
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possibility of future torture shall be considered.”  8 C.F.R. § 
1206.16(c)(3); see Pieschacon-Villegas, 671 F.3d at 310.  
Circumstantial evidence may establish acquiescence to 
targeted acts of violence even when the government has an 
official policy or is engaged in a campaign of opposition 
against the entity the applicant fears.  See id. at 312; Gomez-
Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 351.  
b. The BIA applied the incorrect standard of 
review to the IJ’s determination that Dutton-
Myrie could not establish government 
acquiescence to the torture he fears. 
Dutton-Myrie argues that the BIA erred in reviewing 
for clear error the IJ’s conclusion that the Panamanian 
government would not acquiesce to torture.  True enough, the 
Code of Federal Regulations directs the Board to review the 
IJ’s findings of fact for clear error, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 
(d)(3)(i), but its authority to review questions of law, 
discretion, and judgment is de novo, id. at § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii); 
see also In re Cabrera, 241 I. & N. Dec. 459, 460 (BIA 2008) 
(interpreting the regulation as providing de novo review of 
questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact).  We 
agree with Dutton-Myrie that the question of whether likely 
government conduct equates to acquiescence is a mixed 
question of law and fact under our decision in Kaplun v. Att’y 
Gen., 602 F.3d 260 (3d. Cir. 2010).  What this means is that 
the Board should review without deference the ultimate 
conclusion that the findings of fact do not meet the legal 
standard. 
To determine whether an applicant has met the burden 
of establishing that it is more likely than not he would be 
tortured if removed, the IJ must address two questions: “(1) 
what is likely to happen to the petitioner if removed; and (2) 
does what is likely to happen amount to the legal definition of 
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torture?”  Id. at 271.  In the first part of the inquiry, the IJ 
reviews the evidence and determines future events more 
likely than not to occur.  These findings are “made up of 
facts” and are “distin[ct] from [their] legal effect.” Id. at 269 
(citing Black’s Law Dictionary 669 (9th ed. 2009)).  
Accordingly, the Board reviews these factual findings for 
clear error.  Id. at 269-71.  The IJ then determines whether the 
likely harm qualifies as torture under the governing 
regulations, and the Board reviews this legal conclusion de 
novo.  Id. at 271.  
In assessing whether an applicant has established that 
public officials will acquiesce to the feared tortuous acts of a 
non-state actor, the IJ also must conduct a two-part analysis.  
First, the IJ makes a factual finding or findings as to how 
public officials will likely act in response to the harm the 
petitioner fears.  Next, the IJ assesses whether the likely 
response from public officials qualifies as acquiescence under 
the governing regulations.  As above with respect to 
determinations of torture, this second part of the inquiry is a 
legal question.  While the Board reviews the first part for 
clear error, it must review the second de novo.  
To the extent a dictum in Kaplun suggested that 
whether the government would acquiesce was a factual 
question, id. at 272, it addressed only the first component of 
the inquiry into acquiescence: how the government would 
likely act in response to the harm the applicant fears.  We 
clarify that the IJ must then apply the legal standard for 
acquiescence to determine whether this response establishes 
that a public official was “aware[] of [the torturous] activity” 
and subsequently breaches his or her “legal responsibility to 
intervene to prevent such activity.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7).  
In colloquial terms, the question might be: Is the official 
willfully blind? 
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The Board stated that it found “no clear error in the 
Immigration Judge’s finding that the government of Panama 
would not be acquiescent to any torture.”  While the Board 
was correct in reviewing for clear error the IJ’s factual 
findings (that the government actively engages against 
criminal gangs and that Dutton-Myrie did not provide the 
police notice that the gang attacked him in the past), it should 
have determined de novo whether these findings were 
sufficient to establish acquiescence.  
Although it is possible that the BIA considered the 
appropriate willful blindness standard before concluding that 
the IJ’s factual findings on likely government conduct would 
not qualify as acquiescence to torture as a matter of law, we 
cannot tell from the BIA’s short decision whether this is 
indeed the case.  “In order for us to be able to give 
meaningful review to the BIA’s decision, we must have some 
insight into its reasoning.” Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 
232 (3d Cir. 2003).  In any subsequent opinions in this case, 
the BIA should endeavor to explain clearly which conclusions 
of the IJ it is reviewing and which standard it is applying in so 
doing. 
While we recognize this error may have resulted from 
a miscommunication on our part, the Board’s decision 
illustrates why we must remand.  Because the Board did not 
conduct the second step of this two-part analysis, we have 
little insight into the basis for its determination that the IJ’s 
opinion “clearly reflects that he used the proper ‘willful 
blindness’ standard in relation to the issue of acquiescence.” 
In support of its conclusion, the Board provides only a 
citation to a portion of the IJ’s opinion where he neither 
defines willful blindness nor indicates why Dutton-Myrie’s 
evidence of willful blindness was insufficient to establish 
acquiescence.  While the IJ states that he is incorporating his 
“prior references to the CAT standards,” and that he “already 
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addressed” the holding of Pieschacon-Villegas in prior 
rulings, the Board found that the IJ failed to apply our 
holdings on acquiescence in Pieschacon-Villegas and Roye v. 
Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2012), in those rulings.  
Remand in this instance will give the Board an opportunity to 
provide a reasoned basis for its conclusion as to whether 
Dutton-Myrie can establish the necessary elements of torture.  
c. On remand, the Board must consider 
circumstantial evidence of willful blindness.  
The regulations require the Agency to consider all 
evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture.  See 8 
C.F.R. § 1206.16(c)(3); Pieschacon-Villegas, 671 F.3d at 
315-317.  Circumstantial evidence that public officials are 
willfully blind may establish acquiescence to future torture. 
Hence the Board must consider it.   
Dutton-Myrie submitted circumstantial evidence via 
live testimony and sworn letters attesting that the Panamanian 
government had not taken steps to protect him or his family in 
the past and would likely continue to breach the duty to 
intervene in the future. In particular, he submitted a letter 
from the Panamanian Public Safety Department attesting to 
continued threats to his family members and that his mother 
lodged grievances about these threats with public officials.  
For the IJ not to reference this letter, and then for the BIA to 
intuit that somehow he considered it in concluding against 
Dutton-Myrie, is simply too speculative an inference to draw. 
We also cannot conclude based on the record before us 
that the Board considered other relevant circumstantial 
evidence.  Dutton-Myrie submitted an affidavit from his 
former girlfriend in which she stated that she reported the 
2005 incident to the police. The Board did not address this 
evidence, but stated that the IJ’s decision clearly reflects that 
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he applied the proper willful blindness standard with a 
citation to the final page of his opinion where he dismissed 
Dutton-Myrie’s former girlfriend’s testimony as “not 
verified.”  Why a signed affidavit did not qualify as verified 
testimonial evidence escapes us.  If it is to be disregarded, we 
need to know why.   
Dutton-Myrie also testified about the futility of 
reporting to the police.  In his first decisions, the IJ found this 
testimony credible and never notified Dutton-Myrie of a 
subsequent view otherwise.  In any event, because this 
evidence is relevant to determining if the harm he fears will 
be met with a “blind eye” by authorities, the Board needed to 
consider it.  
We also disagree with the Board’s reliance on two 
factual findings in support its conclusion that the IJ did not err 
in finding no government acquiescence to torture.  It affirmed 
on the grounds that (1) “the record indicates that the 
government of Panama ‘actively engage[s]’ against criminal 
gangs and combats crime,” and (2) “although the applicant 
was attacked in February, 2005, he never reported the 
incident to police.”  However, neither one of these 
circumstances, either alone or with the other, precludes an 
applicant from establishing that the government was willfully 
blind.  “[A]n applicant can establish governmental 
acquiescence even if the government opposes the [] 
organization that is engaged in torturous acts.”  Pieschacon-
Villegas, 671 F.3d at 312.  And nowhere do the regulations 
require actual knowledge of specific torturous acts against the 
applicant.  
When the Board has relied on the failure to report 
crimes to show the absence of actual knowledge by a 
government official, along with the government’s active 
opposition to the group the petitioner fears, in concluding a 
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petitioner cannot establish acquiescence, we have nonetheless 
remanded with instructions to consider circumstantial 
evidence that may establish willful blindness.  See Gomez-
Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 351; Silva-Rengifo, 473 F.3d at 70; see 
also Bhatt v. Att’y Gen., 608 F. App’x 93, 98 (3d Cir. 2015).  
Thus we grant the petition for review and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
We conclude with a comment on Dutton-Myrie’s due 
process claim that the IJ deprived him of his right to a fair 
hearing before a neutral arbiter.2  We do not decide it, but 
note our impression that this case, as it is becoming the 
immigration version of Dickens’s Jarndyce and Jarndyce, 
may be ripe for reassignment if further fact-finding is 
necessary.    
                                              
2 We do not reach Dutton-Myrie’s claim that his due process 
rights were violated by the failure to prepare a record of 
remand proceedings. 
